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Installment Sales of Real Estate
in Colorado
By MORTIMER STONE*
The recent decision of our supreme court in Cavos v. Geihsler
makes pertinent a reconsideration of the law concerning installment
sales of real estate in Colorado under the common form of contract where
(1) the making of specified payments of purchase price is a condition
precedent to the conveyance of title, (2) time of payment is of the
essence and (3) express provision is made that in case of default in
payment, the vendor may upon specified notice retain all payments made
as liquidated damages with forfeiture of all rights of the purchaser.
This form of contract, when the courts permit its enforcement, is
the poor man's friend. The man of means can buy his property for
cash or make sufficient down payment to permit the financing of the
balance by mortgage. By the form of contract above mentioned the
man without sufficient cash payment to protect his mortgagee against
delay and taxes and expense of foreclosure in case of possible default, is
able virtually on the basis of rental payments to accumulate an increasing
equity in his home, which ultimately grows into full ownership and
makes him an interested and established citizen of his community. A
very large percentage of modest homes are purchased under such con-
tracts and their legal status should be stabilized.
While it is impossible to harmonize the decisions from every juris-
diction on this subject, the forfeiture and liquidated damage provisions
of such contracts have generally been considered valid and enforceable
as written, both by the text writers and the courts.2  This right is sub-
ject to the commoti equitable defenses of fraud, excusable ignorance,
surprise, accident or mistake 3 and a vendor may so act as to lose his
*Of the Fort Collins bar.
'123 P. (2d) 822 (Colo., 1942).
2POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed.), sec. 455; 2 BLACK, RESCISSION,
1122 sec. 439; 2 WARVELLE, VENDORS (2d ed.), sec. 807: 27 R. C. L. 448, 613,
644, 664. Leading cases are Glock v. Howard f-4 Wilson Colony Co., 123 Calif. 1.
55 Pac. 713, 43 L. R. A. 199, 69 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1898); Oconto Co. v. Bacon,
181 Wis. 538, 195 N. W. 412. 40 A. L. R. 175 (1923). See also, from nearby
states, Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1081, 26 A. L. R. 523 (1922):
Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108, 145 Pac. 2, Ann. Cas. 1917C 81
(1914) ; Coe v. Bennett, 46 Ida. 62. 266 Pac. 413 (1928) ; Malmstrom v. Apart-
ment Co.. 74 Utah 206, 278 Pac. 811 (1029); Kemmerer v. Title and Trust Co.,
90 Ore. 187, 175 Pac. 865 (1918): Bentley v. Keegan. 109 Kans. 762. 202 Pac. 70
(1921). And see also Hansbrough v. Peck. 4 Wall. (72 U. S.) 479, 18 1.. ed. 520
(1866).
'27 R. C. L. 667; Oconto Co. v. Bacon, supra note 2.
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right to declare a forfeiture by waiver or estoppel.' Defenses, however.
are based not on any past performance of the now defaulting purchaser.
but on some inequitable conduct of the vendor or on some equitable
excuse for vendor's failure to perform. In some jurisdictions it is held
that tender of payment after forfeiture declared is too late; in others,
equity cothsiders such tender on answer to suit to decree forfeiture suffi-
cient, since what vendor sought was his purchase price.
Such provisions are held to be for the benefit of the vendor and to
give him an additional remedy in case of default by the purchaser. "
The vendor still has his remedies of foreclosure and of rescission inde-
pendent of the forfeiture clause or provision for liquidated damages.
But if vendor asks for foreclosure of the purchaser's equity, he must
proceed as in foreclosure and the purchaser be given such time as to the
court shall seem equitable for redemption. 6 This is true even though the
statutory period for mortgage redemption does not apply, and if the
vendor asks for rescission, as distinct from forfeiture under his contract
provision therefor, he must account for all payments and improvements
made by the purchaser, less his provable damages.7  This additional
remedy provided by the forfeiture and liquidated damage clauses is dis-
tinct from the vendor's right to foreclose the purchaser's equity because
upon exercise of vendor's agreed right of forfeiture there is no lien to be
foreclosed. It is distinct from an action for rescission because it seeks
the enforcement rather than the annulment of the contract.,S
The impossibility of estimating in advance the damage which ven-
dor may suffer from breach of contract, due to fluctuating values of real
estate and to depreciation from neglect or misuse, makes stipulation as
to damages in such contracts valid and particularly appropriate.9 Fur-
ther, as was said in Bilz v. Powell,10 quoting from Crisdee u. Bolton: '
" 'Courts have said that the law relative to liquidated damages has always
been in a state of great uncertainty; and that this has been occasioned
by judges endeavoring to make better contracts for parties than they
have made for themselves.' " And again in the same case: " 'A court
of justice has no more authority to put a different construction on the
part of an instrument ascertaining the amount of damages than it has
to decide contrary to any other of its clauses. Our office is to ascertain
'Johnson v. Feskens, 146 Ore. 157, 31 Pac. (2d) 667, 107 A.L.R. 340 (1934).
-27 R. C. L. 613, sec. 367, 66 C. J. 1210. sec. 1071.
666 C. J. 1337. Barnard v. Huff, 252 Mich. 258, 233 N. W. 213, 77 A. IL. R.
259 (1930).
727 R. C. L. 663, 2 BLACK, RESCISSION, 1127.
'See Note 94 A. L. R. 1239, et seq., distinguishing forfeiture, foreclosure and
rescission.
'15 Am. Jur. 684, Glock v. Howard 8 Wilson Colony Co.. supra note 2.
'50Colo. 482, 117 Pac. 344, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 847 (1911).
14 Eng. C. L. Rep. 547.
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the intent of the parties, and, if not contrary to law, to carry their intent
into execution.' "
The proper procedure for eanforcement of the provision for for-
feiture is held' to be by suit to quiet title if vendor is still in possession,
or by ejectment if the purchaser is in possession, and under our Colorado
law, proceeding is also proper under the forcible entry and detainer
statute. 12
The question of enforcement of such contract provisions came
before the Colorado courts in Gordon Tiger Mining Company v.
Brown.'3 There the contract was made for sale of mining property
whereunder purchaser was to pay off liens of $60,000.00, erect a mill
within six months, operate the property and pay a percentage of the
profits to vendor until a total price, including the liens assumed, of
$200,000.00 was paid. The contract provided that conveyances were
to be delivered upon final payment, that in case purchaser determined the
property could not be worked profitably, then possession should be sur-
rendered, the escrowed deeds and agreement should be cancelled and all
moneys paid and improvements added to the property forfeited as liqui-
dated damages, in case of failure to comply. The purchaser took pos-
session and paid liens of $49,000.00, but failed for two years to erect
a mill or to operate except by extending tunnels, uncovering ore and
erecting a boarding house. Then vendor brought suit for possession,
return of escrowed papers and forfeiture of payments and betterments
made under the contract.- Defendant urged that a court of equity never
enforces a forfeiture but it was there held that the relief granted, while
in a sense a forfeiture, "is nothing more than an enforcement of the pro-
visions of the contract between the parties", and further, that "When,
by a contract for the sale of real property the vesting of title is made to
depend upon conditions precedent, with the provision that a failure to
comply with such conditions shall operate as a forfeiture of the rights
of the vendee, then his failure to perform such conditions operates as a
forfeiture of his rights."
The contract involved in Phares v. Don Carlos4 contained no pro-
vision for forfeiture or liquidated damages. Accordingly, while the
court quieted vendor's title by removing the cloud of the recorded
contract, it refused to forfeit the payments made and allowed vendor
only such damages as he might be able to prove because, "Forfeitures
* * * will only be enforced when the strict letter of the contract so
requires."
"American Mortgage Co. v. Logan, 90 Colo. 157, 7 P. (2d) 953 (1932), and
cases there cited.
'56 Colo. 301. 138 Pac. 51 (1914).
"71 Colo. 508, 208 Pac. 458 (1922).
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The contract involved in Roller v. Smith15 provided for forfeiture
and liquidated damages upon vendor's election and his giving notice of
election to the purchaser. Decree of forfeiture was recognized by the
court as proper on vendor's election to forfeit, but a decree of forfeiture
below was reversed because vendor had not himself declared his election
to forfeit.
In Pope E. Parker' the contract contained no provision for for-
feiture or liquidated damages. It only authorized vendor on default
to go on the land and sell it at public sale, making him a mere mortgagee.
Then came the much discussed case of Fairview Mining Corpora-
tion v. American Mines & Smelting Company.17  There an option on
mining property had by acceptance and part payment become a contract of
purchase. As stated in the opinion' s time was not made of the essence and
there was no specific provision for forfeiture. Of a total purchase price
of $150,000.00 only $64,000.00 was unpaid. This balance was due
October 15, 1928, and upon default in payment, plaintiff vendor at-
tempted immediate forfeiture and in less than 30 days thereafter brought
suit in ejectment. Defendant purchaser by answer set up its contract
and part performance and other equitable defenses to which the tril
court sustained a general demurrer. On error, the trial court was
reversed, ejectment denied and plaintiff required to foreclose as a mort-
gagee.
Some statements in the opinion in this case have been urged as
authority beyond the facts involved. The decision on the facts as
found by the court in no wise denies the right of enforcement of for-
feiture when provided for in the agreement and when time is essential;
rather, this case is authority that when there is'no specific provision for
forfeiture in the agreement the court will not insert one. The court
might well have further said that where time is not of the essence, an
attempted forfeiture on the very due date will not be enforced, but that
in such case reasonable notice must be given to make time essential.")
Again the question came before our court in American Mortgage
Company v. Logan,2 0 where Justice Butler, speaking for the court en
banc, reviewed its prior decisions, quoted the applicable rule from Gordon
Tiger Mining Company v. Brown, supra, and quoted also with approval
from Mesa Market Company v. Crosby:
2' 1
176 Colo. 371, 231 Pac. 656 (1925).
184 Colo. 535, 271 Pac. 1118 (1928).
" 86 Colo. 77, 278 Pac. 800 (1929).
'hAt page 83.
1966 C. J. 762-3; POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed.), sec. 1408.
-'Supra note 12.
'174 Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
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'A provision in a contract for the sale of real estate, under
which the purchaser is given possession, that if he shall make
default in the performance of any of his engagements the vendor
may resume possession and terminate all rights of the purchaser,
and that in such case the contract shall become one of lease, and
any payments by the purchaser or improvements made on the prop-
erty shall be considered as rental, is valid and enforceable.'
Further said the court:
"Even if there were equities entitling the mortgage company
to such relief, the court would not decree a foreclosure, as in the
case of mortgages. The utmost that the mortgage company, in
such case, could claim would be a reasonable time after default in
which to perform its agreement and thereby prevent a forfeiture.'
The decision in the American Mortgage Company case is particu-
larly noteworthy, not only because it was en banc and without dissent,
but because after considering the case the court handed down one opinion
sustaining the forfeiture but failing specifically to declare the applicable
law supporting it. Then the Denver Bar Association discussed the
question and opinion and its practical importance was so stressed that
the court withdrew the original opinion and substituted the one reported,
which specifically declares the rule in Colorado that the court will not
relieve against a forfeiture except in case of the usual equitable defenses:
that the language used in the Fairview case must be "considered in con-
nection with the facts", and that the contract of purchase before it "was
not a mortgage, or in the nature of a mortgage, or in effect a mortgage."
Then again the question came before the court in Rocky Mountain
Gold Mines v. Gold, Silver and Tungsten, Inc. ,22 involving the same
mining property as in the Fairview case and a lease and option which was
prepared by counsel with the particular purpose of making a forfeitable
contract in the light of the Fairview case and which by payments had
merged into a contract of sale. This contract by its terms made time of
the essence and provided for forfeiture in case of default. There was
default in payment and vendor had given notice of forfeiture as provided
for and then brought ejectment. Purchaser pleaded his contract and
large payments thereunder, but no equitable defense or even intent to
pay is shown. The trial court sustained the forfeiture but was reversed
on review. In its opinion, the court (with a vigorous dissent by the late
Mr. Justice Bouck) considered that since the purchaser had paid slightly
more than onehalf of the purchase price he had "substantially per-
formed" and thereby there was "breathed into" the legal language of the
104 Colo. 478, 93 P. (2d) 973 (1939).
contract "an equity superior to its terms" and plaintiff must foreclose
as a mortgagee. So the contract provision for forfeiture was ignored
and Pope v. Parker,23 which contained no forfeiture clause and merely
authorized the vendor in case of default "to enter upon the premises
and sell at public sale" is cited as authority. The rule of "breathed
equities superior to the terms of a contract" is a novel doctrine and would
appear to mean in common language that when a purchaser has half
performed a contract he is no longer bound by it.
The Fairview and Rocky Mountain Gold Mines cases, like the
Gordon Tiger case, involved promotional and speculative mining proper-
ties. Had those properties possessed substantial values, after the pay-
ment and improvements made, they could have been readily refinanced.
Such properties and option contracts stand in a class by themselves.
Now we come to the Cavos v. Geihsler case,2 4 which appears to
complete the evolution or dissolution of the rule in Colorado. Here
the agreement provided for sale of a residence property in Denver for
$4,500.00, of which $3,000.00 was to be paid by assumption of an
incumbrance and the balance of $1,500.0 by monthly payments, with
immediate possession by the purchasers. The making of payments was
a condition precedent to conveyance; time was made essential, and there
was express provision for forfeiture and retention of payments as liqui-
dated damages. After more than five years of possession and many
months of default, while purchasers rented the property for $40.00 per
month and did not even pay the rental received on the contract and while
vendor advanced money out of his pocket to pay taxes and interest on
the mortgage, vendor gave notice of intended forfeiture as provided in
the contract and then brought action for possession and forfeiture. The
purchasers owed vendor more than the $1,500.00 they had originally
agreed to pay him for his equity and their only defense was that they
had paid nearly $800.00 on the principal of the mortgage. The court
found that this created a sufficient interest to entitle purchasers to an
equity of redemption. The provision for forfeiture was ignored; Pope
v. Parker was again invoked as involving the same legal principle and
vendor relegated to an action for foreclosure. Even the statutory period
for redemption on mortgage foreclosure was held to apply, but vendor
was denied the right to a deficiency judgment, contrary to the rule in
most jurisdictions.
25
Under this decision the purchaser is given every advantage and the
vendor all the risk under a contract for sale on installments, and the
attorney in Colorado must advise his client that in Colorado he cannot
'"Supra note 16.
'Supra note 1.
'27 R. C. L. 597; Barnard v. Huff, supra note 6.
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safely sell property on monthly payments unless the purchaser can
pay down a sufficient sum to protect him against long delay in pay-
ment, and for taxes, interest, depreciation and costs of foreclosure and
then he must for safety give a deed and take back a deed of trust as
security. Otherwise, he is likely to have the greater delay and expense of
foreclosure through court without right of recovery for damage to his
property or for attorney fees, or deficiency judgment. By this decision
the court is not protecting from imposition but is abetting a poor loser in
refusing performance of his fairly made contract.
From the practical standpoint, this prevents the sale of many prop-
erties and deprives those without substantial resources from purchase of
homes, except through government subsidy.
Cavos v. Geihsler was decided in department with one dissent, so
that it is the voice of a minority only of the court, while American Mort-
gage Company v. Logan was decided en banc, without dissent. It is to
be hoped that the applicable law in Colorado may be further clarified.
Otero County Bar Association Elects Officers
The Otero County Bar Association, at a meeting held at La Junta,
elected D. D. Potter of Rocky Ford as its president for the coming year;
Robert R. Sabin of La Junta, as vice-president, and Mrs. Elizabeth
Guyton of Rocky Ford, secretary. Mrs. Guyton is a new member of
the Otero County Bar Association, having taken over the practice of
W. L. Gobin at Rocky Ford. Her husband, Sergeant W. F. Guyton, is
stationed at the La Junta Air Base.
Two members of the Otero County Bar Association, W. L. Gobin
of Rocky Ford and Lawrence Thulemeyer of La Junta are now in the
armed forces of the United States.
Government Agency Offers Jobs to Lawyers
A government agency has a number of positions open for men
holding law degrees, between ages of 23 and 36 years. Applications
will be received by secretary of Colorado Bar Association at 812 Equitable
Building, Denver. Applicants must be American citizens and be willing
to be assigned anywhere in the United States. Minimum pay is $3,200
per year. The position is probably permanent.
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